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“Grundbesitzer aus Estland”: 
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Baltic Sea area in 1916
Mart Kuldkepp
This article presents a case study of First World War-era activist regional-
ism in the Baltic Sea area. On a more general level, it is an illustration of 
what political resources were used by an opportunistic private diplomat in 
the spring of 1916, when attempting to pull the grand maneuver of liberat-
ing his nation from Russian and Baltic German repression and re-subject-
ing it to the Swedish crown. More particularly, it will constitute a further 
exposition of the ever-fascinating activities of Aleksander Kesküla during 
the First World War, this time acting in consort with another Estonian, 
the book publisher and patriot Jakob Ploompuu.
I will make an attempt to piece together the available information on 
Kesküla’s and Ploompuu’s meeting in Stockholm in the spring of 1916 
and to conduct a contextual analysis of the series of documents signed 
“Grundbesitzer aus Estland” that were born out of their collaboration. On 
the basis of it, I will try to establish their probable authorship and target 
audience, and subsequently draw some conclusions about how Ploompuu’s 
visit and the texts might have fitted into Kesküla’s aims. Finally, I will con-
clude with a brief contextualization of Kesküla’s activities with reference 
to the activist movement as a transnational phenomenon and their place 
in Estonian history.
Activist regionalism
For the time being, I will leave aside any theoretical analysis of the (notori-
ously diffuse) concept of regionalism. Instead, I will resort to a somewhat 
ad hoc definition of regionalism in an attempt to unite presently politically 
heterogeneous but geographically contiguous territories into a culturally, 
politically, and/or economically unified whole (“a region”), with close coop-
eration expected between its different constituent parts, and a particular 
identity on its own. This common identity may be an outgrowth of one 
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Regionalism can, but does not have to, entail imperialism/colonialism. The 
project of constructing a new region can be voluntarily accepted even by 
those who would most likely be fulfilling a subservient role in the region 
imagined – as long as it is preferable to the status quo.
The term „activism“, however, needs some further elucidation, as I am 
going to use it in a particular historical sense. In Finnish and Swedish 
historiography, the term is used to describe radical early twentieth cen-
tury political movements. In the Finnish context, it means the circles that 
attempted to organize active resistance to Russification and secure Fin-
land’s liberation from Russia with the help of Sweden and Germany.1 In 
Sweden, the aim of the activists was to re-activate Swedish foreign policy, 
making it abandon the shameful neutrality2 and turn back to the heroic 
Sweden of the seventeenth century, when it had been a regional great power 
and a worthy enemy to Russia.3 As will be seen, these two activisms were 
inextricably linked. 
In Sweden, similar ideas were to some extent present in most right-wing 
circles,4 but activists proper distinguished themselves after the outbreak 
of the conflict by advocating Sweden’s immediate entry into the war as an 
ally of Germany. Indeed, some of them claimed that Sweden was in some 
sense the “natural” ally of Germany, given the geopolitics of the region.5 
Aided by victorious Germany, Sweden would re-conquer Finland, humili-
ate Russia, and eventually re-claim its “naturally given leading position in 
Norden”.6 As a side issue, even the question of the so-called Baltic prov-
inces’ possible reunification with the former motherland popped up in 
activist literature,7 but generally paled in importance compared with the 
interest in Finland and Åland.
1   See: Lauri Hyvämäki, “Kommunismi ja jälkiaktivismi”, Suomalainen Suomi, 5 (1958), 
277–278.
2   Adrian Molin, “Stark eller svag neutralitet”, Det Nya Sverige, 1 (1915), 1–7.
3   L. Torbjörn Norman, “Right-wing Scandinavism and the Russian menace”, Contact 
or isolation? Soviet-Western relations in the interwar period, ed. by John Hiden and 
Aleksander Loit, Studia Baltica Stockholmiensia, 8 (Stockholm: University of Stockholm, 
1991), 338.
4  See: Sverker Oredsson, “Stormaktsdrömmar och stridsiver: ett tema i svensk 
opinionsbildning och politik 1910–1942”, Scandia, 59:2 (1993), 257–296.
5  Especially Rudolf Kjellén. See: Otto Järte, Rudolf Kjellén, Yngve Larsson, Adrian 
Molin, Sveriges utrikespolitik i världskrigets belysning (Stockholm: Nordiska Bokhandeln, 
1915), 13–14.
6   Järte et al., Sveriges utrikespolitik i världskrigets belysning, 21–23.
7   See: “Sverige och Östern”, Svensk Lösen (April 12, 1918), 78–79; “Estland”, Svensk Lösen 
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The Swedish activists, building on the common anti-Russian and pro-
Finnish sentiments, naturally cooperated with the Finnish activists, repre-
sented in Stockholm by a substantial exile community, even though there 
were major differences in their outlook on the nature of the eventual Finn-
ish independence.8 Activists also shared common interests with Germany, 
which at least during 1915 actively encouraged Sweden to join the Triple 
Alliance, and many representatives of Germany in Sweden (though not 
the ambassador von Lucius) collaborated with the Swedish warmongers.9
There was also at least one Estonian – Aleksander Kesküla – who could 
be regarded as belonging to the same movement, although he brought with 
himself a uniquely Estonian perspective. He, too, tried to make Sweden join 
the German cause, carry out its historical mission of liberating Finland and 
Estonia, and ultimately bring about some sort of a union between Sweden, 
Finland, and Estonia. Kesküla also belonged to the activist network in a 
practical sense, having personal ties to like-minded Finns, Swedes, and 
Germans residing in Stockholm. What made him unlike his Swedish and 
Finnish counterparts, though, was that Kesküla was wary of Germany and 
especially Baltic Germans, the oppressive nobility in his native land. At 
the same time, he was perfectly willing to accept German support when 
he found that his interests happened to coincide with Germany’s.10
What makes activism interesting as a kind of regionalism was that it 
was not a simply Swedish imperialist project. The dream of the demise of 
Russia and the new rise of heroic Sweden brought together Swedes, Finns, 
Estonians, and in a sense also Germans. The First World War, furthermore, 
seemed like a great opportunity for a united action to make it happen. The 
temporarily upset political and military balance between the great pow-
ers promised potentially enormous political gains for the repressed and 
humiliated nations of Europe. To make it happen, nearly all means were 
permitted, not least cooperation with the spies of Germany or the ambas-
sadors of the Entente, with Russian bolsheviks or American peace activ-
ists, if that was what the circumstances prescribed.
8  Mats Kihlberg, “Aktivismens huvudorgan Svensk Lösen”, Mats Kihlberg, Donald 
Söderlind, Två studier i svensk konservatism, 1916–1922 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 
1961), 21–22; Norman, Right-wing Scandinavianism and the Russian menace, 339–340.
9   About the Swedish activists’ ties to Germany, see: Inger Schuberth, Schweden und 
das Deutsche Reich im Ersten Weltkrieg. Die Aktivistenbewegung 1914–1918 (Bonn: 
Röhrscheid, 1981).
10   In the autumn of 1914, Kesküla became a German agent on his own initiative. See: 
Kaido Jaanson, “Eestlane Aleksander Kesküla ja Berliin: avang”, Tuna, 1 (2004), 13–15.140 Ajalooline Ajakiri, 2012,  1/2 (139/140)
Aleksander Kesküla and Sweden
Some aspects of Aleksander Kesküla’s activities during the war are rela-
tively well known, in particular the role he played as a mediator of Ger-
man money to Russian bolsheviks.11 Less is known about his contacts with 
Finns and Swedes, even though Michael Futrell pointed out long ago that 
Kesküla’s Swedish contacts might be “a rewarding piece of research”.12 It 
is nevertheless certain that Sweden played a role in Kesküla’s plans from 
the beginning. In September 1914, he contacted the German ambassador 
in Bern, Gisbert von Romberg, and offered his help in drawing Sweden 
into the war on the German side, on the condition that Germany would 
not occupy Estonia. Kesküla wrote that his personal goal was the reuni-
fication of Estonia with Sweden,13 and he expected it to become possible 
with a joint German-Swedish victory and the disintegration of Russia.14
Shortly after the German Foreign Office had accepted his proposal, Kes-
küla traveled to Sweden. He stayed in Stockholm for three longer periods 
of time: from October 1914 until the beginning of 1915, from May 1915 until 
June 1916 and from the end of 1916 until the autumn of 1918. There, his main 
task as an agent became the infiltration of the exile Russian bolshevik cir-
cles, helping them in various ways with the aim of weakening Russia, and 
keeping his German handlers updated with information.15
On his own volition, Kesküla began work on a second major task: mak-
ing contacts with potentially useful circles in Sweden in order to spread his 
rather tendentious picture of the history and present situation of Estonia   
and to promote his activist solution to it.16 It is likely that Kesküla thought 
11   For an in-depth bibliography on Kesküla’s contacts with the bolsheviks, see: Jonathan 
D. Smele, The Russian Revolution and Civil War 1917–1921: an annotated bibliography 
(London/New York: Continuum, 2006), 380–384.
12   Michael Futrell, Northern underground: episodes of Russian revolutionary transport 
and communications through Scandinavia and Finland, 1863–1917 (London: Faber & 
Faber Ltd, 1963), 147.
13   Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amtes, Wk, 11c, secr. Bd. 1, l. 113. See also Olavi 
Arens, “Aleksander Kesküla”, Eesti Teaduste Akadeemia Toimetised: ühiskonnateadused, 
40:1 (1991), 30; Jaanson, Eestlane Aleksander Kesküla ja Berliin, 14; Seppo Zetterberg, Die 
Liga der Fremdvölker Russlands 1916–1918: ein Beitrag zu Deutschlands antirussischem 
Propagandakrieg unter den Fremdvölkern Russlands im Ersten Weltkrieg (Helsinki: 
Finnische Historische Gesellschaft, 1978), 54. A more systematic overview of Kesküla’s 
world view and political aims is found in Kaido Jaanson, “Aleksander Kesküla 
maailmanägemus”, Acta Historica Tallinensia, 6 (2002).
14   Arens, Aleksander Kesküla, 21.
15   Kaido Jaanson, “Aleksander Kesküla and Sweden 1914–1918”, Scandia, 69:2 (2003), 158–161.
16  The thinking characteristic of Kesküla is best captured in the memorandum he 
presented to the III Conference of the Union des Nationalités in 1916: [Aleksander 141 Mart Kuldkepp: Activist regionalism in the Baltic Sea area in 1916
these activities to be more important than his work with the bolsheviks.17 
In this, however, his main competitors were the Baltic German organiza-
tions. Several of those were cooperating with Imperial Germany and, like 
Germans, tried to make use of the activist currents in Sweden. But unlike 
Kesküla, they were proceeding from a perspective that left no room for the 
national ambitions of Estonians.18
Jakob Ploompuu’s travels and the contact with Aleksander Kesküla
In the spring of 1916, Kesküla received the unexpected news that another 
Estonian was visiting Stockholm with aims very similar to his own. Today, 
Jakob Ploompuu is remembered as one of the most successful publishers 
and booksellers of early twentieth-century Estonia.19 About his activities as 
an undercover diplomat, however, little is known. The main extant source 
on this is his undated letter to his sister Leena Vesterinen, subsequently 
published.20 Judging by some of the claims made therein, it is clear that 
this short piece of memoir should be approached with caution.21 However, 
as far as it can be trusted, it is a valuable record of the history of Estonian 
proto-diplomacy.
Supposedly, Ploompuu began his attempts at clandestinely furthering 
the Estonian cause abroad in 1913. As a motivation to embark on this dan-
gerous path, he claims to have during the Russo-Japanese war reached the 
conclusion that in a possible conflict with Germany, Russia would emerge 
as the loser. But as German rule would have become as “nationally destruc-
tive” for Estonians as the Russian one, a third way had to be found. Thus 
he sought contact with powers that might have an interest in keeping the 
German presence in the Baltic Sea area under control.
Kesküla], La Question Esthonienne et la Question Septentrionale: Mémoire présenté au 
nom des Esthoniens de la III conference des Nationalités, par M. Kesküla (Lausanne: 
Librairie centrale des Nationalités, 1918).
17  This judgment is shared by Kaido Jaanson: Jaanson, Aleksander Kesküla 
maailmanägemus, 113.
18  About Baltic German activism, see: Aleksander Loit, “Baltisaksa rüütelkondade 
seisukohad ja tegevus Eesti iseseisvumisel 1918–1920”, Tuna, 4 (2006), 50–74.
19   Signe Jantson, “Booksellers, publishers and press workers in the second half of the 
19th and early in the 20th century in Estonia”, Knygotyra, 52 (2009), 239.
20   Jakob Ploompuu, “Kiri vabariigi eelaegadest”, Tulimuld, 1 (1951), 42–45.
21   For example, Ploompuu claims to have been present at the printing of the Estonian 
independence manifesto (Ploompuu, Kiri vabariigi eelaegadest, 45). This claim is not 
corroborated by recent research. See: Ago Pajur, “Iseseisvusmanifesti sünd”, Tuna, 1 
(2003), 39–41.142 Ajalooline Ajakiri, 2012,  1/2 (139/140)
In 1913, Ploompuu visited the British Foreign Office in London to warn 
them of the danger that Germany might take advantage of the discontent 
of the repressed nations of the Russian Empire. Next year, he followed up 
with a memorandum sent to the British St. Petersburg embassy, focusing 
on the same issue.22 Although it is doubtful whether either of these actions 
led to any results, they nevertheless give evidence of the rather unexpected 
determination with which he tried to influence international politics.
In early 1915, spurred by the hope that Sweden might be about to enter 
the war, Ploompuu traveled to Stockholm with the help of the passport 
of his Finnish brother-in-law, Emil Vesterinen. There, he passed to the 
Swedish General Staff a memorandum, warning that “in case the Swed-
ish military power should take part in the world war, it would not at all 
be advantageous to leave in Estonia the impression that Sweden acted in 
order to help Germany”.23
The same visit is also described by Aleksander Kesküla in his Beilage 
to the 1916 text, “An die Patrioten Schwedens”.24 Without referring to 
Ploompuu by name, Kesküla writes that his 1915 journey had been a fail-
ure because he had lacked all necessary contacts in Sweden. As he knew no 
Swedish and but a little German, even his memorandum had been written 
with the help of a translation bureau(!). As far as the contents of the text, 
Kesküla adds that it had stressed the Estonian peasants’ strong conviction 
that a Swedish declaration of war against Russia would be inevitable and 
merely a question of time. Once the Estonian territory had been occupied, 
however, the Swedish government would do good to publish a manifesto 
declaring that Sweden had not started the war with the intention of help-
ing Germany, but was forced into it for the sake of its own security and 
national future – a goal in which Swedish aims and interests were entirely 
compatible with those of the small nations living around the Baltic Sea.25
A year later, Ploompuu was again on the way to Stockholm. As the 
political situation had changed, he this time had to resort to the secret pas-
sages of the Finnish Jäger volunteers who were being smuggled out of Fin-
land in order to receive military training in Germany.26 In other respects, 
22   Ploompuu, Kiri vabariigi eelaegadest, 43–44.
23   Ibid., 44.
24   Kungliga Biblioteket [henceforth KB], Otto Järtes Efterlämnade Papper, L78:5: An 
die Patrioten Schwedens.
25   Ibid.
26  For information about the Jäger movement, see the references in Zetterberg, Die 
Liga der Fremdvölker Russlands 1916–1918, 39. As Ploompuu’s stay in Stockholm was 
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however, the situation had improved. Ploompuu’s Finnish acquaintances 
had provided him with the address of Herman Gummerus, a well-con-
nected Finnish activist residing in Stockholm. Once he arrived, Ploompuu 
went to Gummerus at once.27
There, he was informed by Gummerus that the interests of Estonians 
were mainly represented in Stockholm by Mr. Kesküla (in Ploompuu’s 
account “Keskküla”).28 As Gummerus relates in his memoirs, the Estonian 
–an envoy of a “patriotic organization in Tallinn”– had been surprised to 
hear Kesküla’s name, since the latter was suspected in Estonia of having 
been the agent of Okhrana. Once Gummerus brought the two Estonians 
together, however, they were soon reconciled.29
What Kesküla himself thought of the unexpected visitor, at least prior 
to meeting him, is disclosed in his letter to Hans Steinwachs, dated 3 March 
1916.30 In the letter, Kesküla reports that he was expected at Gummerus’ by 
an unknown Finnish-speaking Estonian claiming to represent some circles 
in Estonia. What is interesting about Kesküla’s account is that he repeatedly 
expresses his satisfaction with the fact that the aforementioned Estonian 
had reached Stockholm without having used his (Kesküla’s) help or con-
nections. This pleases him as evidence of the rightness of his own Scandi-
navian-oriented endeavors, also giving him an important trump-card in 
the eyes of Swedes, to whom he thus far had only been able to bring Finn-
ish activists as witnesses that the Estonian “svecophilia” was not merely his 
personal conviction or fantasy. Kesküla adds that for that reason, it would 
be a pleasant surprise if the Herr Kompatriot in question turned out to be 
a personal or political enemy of his. In light of the Okhrana accusation, 
this hope was to a degree perhaps also fulfilled.
Swedish police bureau for the monitoring of foreigners (Polisbyrån för övervakandet 
av utlänningar) (Kaido Jaanson, “Eestlased Rootsi salapolitsei valvsa silma all Esimese 
maailmasõja ajal”, Tuna, 1 (2003), 23).
27   Ploompuu, Kiri vabariigi eelaegadest, 44. Ploompuu’s contacts with Finnish activists 
are also mentioned by Kesküla: Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amtes, Secret 11, 
Varia III, 1, l. 218718.
28   Ploompuu, Kiri vabariigi eelaegadest, 44.
29   Herman Gummerus, Jägare och aktivister. Hågkomster från krigsåren i Stockholm 
och Berlin (Helsingfors: Söderström & Co Förlags Aktiebolag), 193. Gummerus’ and 
Ploompuu’s accounts of this meeting have been compared by Kaido Jaanson: Kaido 
Jaanson, “See kummaline eestlane”, Looming, 7 (1990), 965–966.
30   Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amtes, Secret 11, Varia III, 1, l. 218719. Steinwachs 
was Kesküla’s handler and an agent of the political department of the German General 
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It seems that for Kesküla, later accused by Steinwachs of “overestimat-
ing his tiny homeland, compatriots and himself”,31 Ploompuu’s arrival rep-
resented a long-awaited chance of escaping the legitimation crisis inherent 
to him being the sole representative of Estonian activism in Stockholm. 
How Kesküla attempted to make use of this lucky chance is best witnessed 
by the four texts that were probably written in connection to this episode.
The writings of “Grundbesitzer aus Estland“
Copies of the texts that will be subsequently analyzed can be found in the 
Royal Library of Stockholm among the papers of Swedish activists Otto 
Järte and Adrian Molin. Additional copies of one of the texts are also located 
in the political archive of Auswärtiges Amt in Berlin. Even though the texts 
are anonymous, there is in light of the information presented above almost 
no doubt in their connection to Ploompuu and Kesküla.
The first of these documents bears the title “An die ‘neutrale Friedens-
konferenz’ in Stockholm” (“To the ‘Neutral Peace Conference’ in Stock-
holm”) and is slightly more than eight typewritten pages in length, con-
cluding with a handwritten note signed “A. K.”32 The same text has also 
been preserved in two additional copies in Berlin,33 one of them in French 
translation.34 The Berlin archive also contains some typed comments of 
mainly the same content as the handwritten note added to Otto Järte’s 
copy in Sweden.35
The second text is titled “An die Patrioten Schwedens” (“To the Swed-
ish Patriots”) and covers about five and a half typewritten pages.36 It also 
includes a page-length Beilage signed “Der Uebersetzer” (the translator). The 
third text is three pages in length and bears the title “Entwurf eines poli-
tischen Programmes für den Fall eines Einmarsches der deutschen Armeen 
in das Land der Esthen” (“The Proposal of a Political Program in the Case  
31   Arens, Aleksander Kesküla, 36.
32   KB, Otto Järtes Efterlämnade Papper, L78:5: An die “neutrale Friedenskonferenz”.
33   Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amtes, Secret 11, Varia III, 1, l. 249007–16. As these 
texts were found by Kaido Jaanson, copies of them have been preserved in his archive in 
Estonian Historical Archives [Ajalooarhiiv, henceforth EAA], f. 5377, n. 1, s. 73, l. 157–166.
34  “Au congrès neutre de la paix à Stockholm”: Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges 
Amtes, Secret 11, Varia III, 1, l. 249017–25.
35   Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amtes, Secret 11, Varia III, 1, l. 248822–24.
36   KB, Otto Järtes Efterlämnade Papper, L78:5 An die Patrioten Schwedens; KB, Adrian 
Molins Efterlämnade Papper, L0046:25A. In Järte’s archive, the text is preserved in two 
different copies, one of which includes a section about the 1915 memorandum containing 
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of the Invasion of the German Army into the Land of Estonians”).37 There 
is also a fourth text, the three-and-a-half pages long “Ueber die Unter-
drückung der Russen durch die Esthen” (“On the Repression of Russians 
by Estonians”).38
All texts are dated March 1916 and signed “Grundbesitzer aus Ehstland” 
(or “... in Ehstland”), i.e. “Estonian Landowner”, with the exception of the 
copy of the first text in Järte’s archive, signed by Kesküla’s hand as “Unter-
zeichnet ein estnischer Grundbesitzer und Mittelständler” (“Signed by an 
Estonian Landowner and Middle Class Representative”). All texts appear 
to have been written roughly at the same time and on the same typewriter, 
resembling Kesküla’s other typewritten papers of the period (e.g. in the use 
of capital “J” instead of “I”). 
The texts claim to have been translated from Estonian. “The Proposal 
of a Political Program...” and one of Järte’s copies of “To the Swedish Patri-
ots” conclude with the comment “Uebersetzung aus dem Esthnischen” 
(“Translation from Estonian”). The Beilage added to one of the copies of 
the latter text is likewise signed by someone calling himself “Der Ueber-
setzer” (“The translator”). It seems very likely that this “translator” was 
Aleksander Kesküla, who, judged by the characteristic handwriting and 
the signature “A. K.”, was also the author of the undated39 but probably 
37   KB, Otto Järtes Efterlämnade Papper, L78:5 Entwurf eines politischen Programmes...; 
KB, Adrian Molins Efterlämnade Papper, L0046:25C.
38   KB, Otto Järtes Efterlämnade Papper, L78:5 Ueber die Unterdrückung..., KB, Adrian 
Molins Efterlämnade Papper, L0046:25D. This text, which will not be treated here at 
length, is a partial translation of an article published in the Estonian newspaper Tallinna 
Teataja (nr 88, May 3 1916) titled “Lonkav loogika” (“Faulty Logic”). This article, in 
turn, is a response to an editorial that had appeared in the Russian-language newspaper 
Revelskiya Isvestiya. In the editorial, Estonians were accused of having excessive 
nationalist pride, expressed in their unwillingness to speak Russian and the tendency 
to treat speakers of Russian unfairly. In their response, Tallinna Teataja writes that “one 
would really need to be out of his wits to openly accuse Estonians of haughtiness” and 
that in any case, the war was being led for the protection of smaller nations, apparent 
from Britain taking up the Belgian cause and Russia Serbia’s. The “Grundbesitzer” text 
is a compilation of translated examples of alleged cases of excessive Estonian pride with 
some “translator’s” comments (mainly “sic!” appended to Revelskiya Isvestiya’s most 
chauvinist allegations). The copy preserved in Järte’s archive includes a large note written 
in Kesküla’s hand concluding the text: “The Scandinavian (=Great-Swedish) interests of 
Estonians are not a consequence of weakness, but a result of national vigor!”
39   In June 1916, Kesküla left Stockholm and did not return until the next year: Kaido 
Jaanson, “Eestlane Aleksander Kesküla ja rahvuste uniooni III konverents Lausanne’is 
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roughly contemporary handwritten note to the peace conference text pre-
served in the archive of Otto Järte, as well as of the typewritten Beilage to 
the same text in Berlin.40
Circumstantial evidence also suggests that the texts were composed in 
Stockholm. In the letter to his sister, Ploompuu claims to have brought no 
papers with himself, having to learn all names and directions by heart.41 If 
one is to trust Ploompuu on this point, then, keeping in mind that Kesküla 
saw in his arrival a chance of bolstering his claims of the Swedish orien-
tation of Estonians, it seems a priori likely that the “translator” Kesküla, 
not Ploompuu, was in fact the main author of the texts. Furthermore, as 
Ploompuu himself does not mention any written texts in connection with 
the 1916 visit, it is not impossible he was even unaware of their existence.
The question of whether and to what degree “Grundbesitzer aus Est-
land” was simply Kesküla’s mystification should be reconsidered after a 
contextual analysis of the texts has been conducted. But at the same time, 
this does not change the fact that Ploompuu’s visit left a mark on its own, 
playing at the very least the role of the gate that enabled Kesküla to take 
on the Grundbesitzer identity.
Ploompuu’s presentation at the Neutral Peace Conference
The culmination of Ploompuu’s visit was his appearance before the del-
egates of The Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation. This unoffi-
cial peace conference, supported by the finances of American millionaire 
Henry Ford, was held in Stockholm’s Grand Hotel in March 1916. Approxi-
mately 40 delegates, many of them internationally well-known peace activ-
ists, were busy with writing an appeal from neutral countries to belliger-
ent powers, proposing the terms on which a lasting world peace could be 
built. At the same time, the conference received appeals and petitions from 
representatives of various oppressed nations.42
Of the latter cases, the conference’s general secretary Louis P. Lochner 
had in his book on Henry Ford’s peace ambitions singled out one in par-
ticular as “the most dramatic of all”. This was the unexpected appearance 
before the conference of “an Esthonian peasant”, who, according to Loch-
ner, had crossed the Finnish border at the risk of his life and traveled on skis 
40   “Anmerkung des Uebersetzers”: Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amtes, Secret 
11, Varia III, 1, l. 248822–24.
41   Ploompuu, Kiri vabariigi eelaegadest, 44.
42  See: Barbara S. Kraft, The Peace Ship: Henry Ford’s pacifist adventure in the First 
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over many miles of the rough Norrland landscape. The man did not dare 
to tell his name and asked that his visit remain secret for ten days until he 
had had time to safely return. Lochner writes that the Estonian’s plea in the 
name of his people tragically suffering under the Tsarist regime, delivered 
with the help of an interpreter, deeply stirred the emotions of the conference 
delegates with its sincere simplicity.43 The same sort of pathos is also pre-
sent in a shorter account of this event by another delegate, Jane Addams.44
Ploompuu’s own description of this event is rather brief. “Facilitated 
by Mr. Keskküla,” he writes, an “Estonian evening” was organized at the 
American Embassy,45 where Ploompuu gave a speech that was also trans-
lated (or perhaps interpreted) into English. In his speech, he demanded 
that more attention be paid to the vital problems of smaller nationalities, 
such as the fact that Estonians were suffering heavy economical losses due 
to being forced to learn Russian in school. During the discussion, Ploom-
puu was posed the question of whether Estonians were Russian- or Ger-
man-friendly, to which he gave the answer that the resources of the small 
Estonian nation were only sufficient for being Estonian-friendly. Shortly 
after that, Ploompuu left Stockholm “with satisfied feelings that even the 
Estonian question is getting somewhere” and his Finnish friends helped 
him back home.46
Kesküla gives some additional details about the presentation in his 
handwritten note added to the peace conference text.47 Claiming that the 
document in question had been personally handed to him in March at the 
American peace conference in Stockholm, he adds that the author had held 
a speech on the same topic, posing complaints on the repressive Russian 
politics in the “former Swedish Baltic Sea provinces”. When questioned 
about the Estonian opinion on the annexation of Belgium, the author had 
replied that “for the sake of Estonian public school, we would be prepared 
43   Louis Paul Lochner, America’s Don Quixote: Henry Ford’s attempt to save Europe, 
with a preface by Maxim Gorki (London: International Publishers, 1925), 146.
44   Jane Addams, Peace and bread in times of war (New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1922), 43. Addams’ and Lochner’s accounts are remarkably similar, making it possible 
that Lochner was partly relying on Addams’ earlier book, or that they both were using 
a common third source. At the same time, Lochner’s text includes details not present 
in Addams’.
45   This claim seems highly unlikely, as the unofficial peace conference had not enjoyed 
the recognition nor the support of the embassy. This is emphasized in the memoirs of 
the United States ambassador to Sweden at that time, Ira N. Morris: Ira Nelson Morris, 
Minnen från min ministertid i Stockholm 1914–1923 (Stockholm: P. A. Norstedt & Söners 
Förlag, 1923), 52.
46   Ploompuu, Kiri vabariigi eelaegadest, 45.
47   KB, Otto Järtes Efterlämnade Papper, L78:5: An die “neutrale Friedenskonferenz”.148 Ajalooline Ajakiri, 2012,  1/2 (139/140)
to share the fate of Belgium”. When asked, however, which belligerent 
side was being supported by the inhabitants of the former Swedish Baltic 
Sea provinces, the author had, according to Kesküla, answered that their 
support belonged to “neither Russia nor Germany; the only foreign power 
that has our sympathy is Sweden, which has done so much to improve our 
national, cultural and social situation.” According to Kesküla, the peace 
conference delegates had also promised to inform other neutral countries 
of the Estonian situation. For this purpose, the text of the speech was trans-
lated into English and sent to the United States.
Concerning the author of the speech, Kesküla wrote that he is the father 
of six children and an owner of real estate, as well as that he had secretly 
crossed the Russian-Swedish border but already returned the same way 
home, which is why his writings could be made public. In the Beilage to the 
text found in Berlin, Kesküla adds that the author is somewhat less than 50 
years old and very highly regarded in his native country, having held sev-
eral national and political posts. Kesküla claims that the views presented 
in the text are representative of the majority of the Estonian middle class; 
by whom the author had been entrusted with the mission of presenting 
them to the peace conference. About the occasion, Kesküla adds that it was 
at an ad hoc extraordinary meeting of the conference where his speech had 
been received with much sympathy.48
The exact relationship between the written Neutral Peace Conference 
text and Ploompuu’s speech is difficult to establish. Calculations about 
the economic cost of the forced learning of Russian are certainly present 
in the written version, but the very existence of a written memorandum 
is unmentioned in Ploompuu’s account. This can be interpreted as a sign 
of the latter’s unreliability, but it could also plausibly mean that the text – 
perhaps a thoroughly modified version of it – was spread without Ploom-
puu’s knowledge.
The discrepancy between Kesküla’s and Ploompuu’s accounts of the 
answer to the question about Estonian war sympathies is similarly prob-
lematic. Did he reply that Estonians were “only Estonian-friendly”, or that 
their sympathy only belonged to Sweden? Whereas the first answer seems 
to express the Estonian demands for autonomy, the second one suggests 
a wish of being re-subjected to the Swedish king. Ploompuu might have 
changed his answer later, wanting to disassociate himself from his previous, 
ultimately fruitless hopes for Swedish intervention. The second answer, on 
48   Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amtes, Secret 11, Varia III, 1, l. 248822–23.149 Mart Kuldkepp: Activist regionalism in the Baltic Sea area in 1916
the other hand, is so closely aligned with the thought of Kesküla and the 
Swedish activists, that it could easily be Kesküla’s invention.
The memorandum to the Neutral Peace Conference
Even though little is known with certainty about the contents of Ploom-
puu’s speech, it is likely that it at least partly overlapped with the written 
memorandum titled “To the ‘Neutral Peace Conference’ in Stockholm”. 
The contents of this text can be summarized as follows: 
It is likely that neither belligerent side will achieve conclusive victory 
over the other, and there is little hope that war losses would be compen-
sated due to the enormity of the expenses incurred. There exists a precedent 
from the Crimean War that the conquered territories do not become the 
property of the winning state but are instead handed over to the local peo-
ples. The same policy should be adopted by Entente and Germany during 
the peace talks on the condition that the other side does the same. In that 
way, the autonomy of all the oppressed peoples could be achieved (“Home 
rule für alle unterdrückten Völkerschaften”).
Every state that has national minorities living on its territory should 
guarantee them full language and cultural rights in proportion with the 
state’s size and population. The exercise of these rights should be overseen 
by an international court or neutral states. It is not true that small nation-
alities are not ready for autonomy; they merely need a chance to prove 
themselves in free cultural competition. Until now, the subjugated small 
nationalities have only suffered cultural repression, above all in Russia. 
Therefore, it is understandable that they have begun entertaining their own 
hopes of liberation in connection with the end result of the world war.49
For them, it would be most natural to punish Russia, the greatest of 
all oppressors, as well as the state most damaged in the war, and itself the 
most culturally backwards of all great powers. If Germany would help the 
repressed nations to achieve liberation from Russia, it would earn their 
gratitude and openness to German industry and trade. At the same time, 
a wide belt of neutral territories would appear between the Central Powers 
and the aggressive Great Russian imperialism and militarism – the latter of 
which might become a danger to international security in the near future.
49   Such expectations, as well as the hope for German help, were indeed rather widespread 
among the national minorities of Russia during the First World War. See: Ants Piip, 
Tormine aasta: ülevaade Eesti välispoliitika esiajast 1917.–1918. aastal dokumentides ja 
mälestusis (Stockholm: Kirjastus Vaba Eesti, 1966 [1934]), 4; Zetterberg, Die Liga der 
Fremdvölker Russlands 1916–1918, 41–50.150 Ajalooline Ajakiri, 2012,  1/2 (139/140)
Both liberal Britain and republican France should be content with the exer-
cise of the right of national self-determination in the above-described man-
ner. In this way, the questions of Poland, Finland, the former Swedish Baltic 
Sea provinces (Estland, Livland, Ingria), and Alsace-Lorraine would be solved, 
and guidelines would be established for solutions to the Balkan questions.
The drawing of customs borders should certainly be avoided, lest Ger-
man industry be suffocated. Thus the peace treaty must guarantee certain 
commercial rights to Germany, above all to colonies in Africa. But Ger-
man forces must be drawn out from Belgium, Poland re-established as a 
free state, and the Baltic Sea countries handed over to their native popula-
tions (Estonians and Lithuanians). Even the part of the population that had 
emigrated due to oppressive Russian policies would, in that case, happily 
return to their homes. It would not be necessary to extend the territory of 
Germany at the expense of others, as long as other German interests in for-
eign countries would not be infringed. Quite the contrary, Germany and 
other states would get a chance to demonstrate their cultural supremacy 
in free competition with others.
Because all belligerents have suffered such great losses, that it is impos-
sible to expect them to be compensated for, the peace terms have to include 
the general abolishment of war, the use of respective military budgets for 
other purposes, and the creation of a general court of arbitration.
In the last part of the text, the aforementioned peace terms are repeated 
in the form of a numbered list. The text is concluded by a plea to the del-
egates of the conference; that they take notice of the suffering and wishes 
of the Estonian people, “who for 200 years have been hampered and hin-
dered by a foreign, barbarous power.”
The peace terms of “Grundbesitzer aus Estland“ and the seven 
principles of the Neutral Conference, and the question of authorship
The argumentation of Grundbesitzer’s Neutral Peace Conference text pro-
ceeds from the assumption that the principle of national self-determina-
tion is applicable to even smaller nations. Not demanding national inde-
pendence but merely autonomy for the national minorities of Russia, the 
author nevertheless sees their autonomy as an international issue, the posi-
tive solution of which would serve the interests of both warring sides with 
the exception of Russia. At the same time, it was supposed that the total 
collapse of either side would be unlikely, meaning that even after the war, 
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This part of the reasoning might have been the creation of Ploompuu, 
but the rest of the text mirrors so closely the efforts and goals of the Neu-
tral Peace Conference that even this seems rather unlikely. In fact, remark-
able commonalities can be found between the Grundbesitzer’s text and the 
main result reached by the Neutral Conference in April 1916.50 Its appeal 
to the international community is sometimes regarded as a predecessor to 
Woodrow Wilson’s famous Fourteen Points.51
The appeal of the Neutral Conference consists of a list of proposals 
for how a lasting peace might be achieved (the so-called seven universal 
principles), and examples of how these should be put into practice. It was 
intended that the inclusion of these principles in future peace treaties and 
their universal recognition would ensure a peace that would “not only 
satisfy the legitimate needs of the warring nations themselves, but also 
advance the welfare of the humanity at large.”52 
The first principle of the Neutral Peace Conference (A.) establishes that 
“no transfer of territory should take place without the consent of the popu-
lation involved, and that nations should have the right to decide their own 
fate.” This meant that Belgium’s, Serbia’s, and Montenegro’s independence 
would have to be restored, the occupied French territories (Alsace-Lorraine) 
returned to France, and Poland reunited. The second principle (B.) demands 
that the “economic activity of all peoples should be afforded development 
on equal terms”, meaning that the German colonies would be returned 
and “Germany’s access to Near East” guaranteed. The third principle (C.) 
calls for the freedom of the seas; the fourth (D.) for parliamentary control 
of foreign policy – so that secret diplomacy would no longer endanger the 
interests of the nations. The fifth principle (E.) calls for the establishment 
of an international organization that would offer peaceful settlements to 
conflicts between states. The sixth principle (F.) insists on disarmament by 
international agreement and the seventh principle (G.) demands a “World 
Congress” to be established, including representatives from both belliger-
ents and neutrals, so that a peaceful world order could be guaranteed for 
the future, not least by “guaranteeing political and spiritual freedom to 
special nationalities united with other peoples.”53
50   See: Lochner, America’s Don Quixote, 147–150 and Kraft, The Peace Ship, 221–222. 
51  As noted by Barbara S. Kraft: “[w]ith the exception of the suggestions regarding 
Germany, every provision suggested was included in Wilson’s Fourteen Points Address 
of almost two years later”, Kraft, The Peace Ship, 222. 
52   Lochner, America’s Don Quixote, 148.
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It is a remarkable fact that Grundbesitzer’s memorandum concludes 
likewise with a list of seven peace terms that correspond rather well to 
those listed in the Neutral Peace Conference’s appeal. The first of those 
is a demand for guaranteed national self-determination (in the form of a 
“Home rule”) to all oppressed peoples (1. corresponding to A.), the second 
asks for trade concessions to Germany, as well as freedom of the seas and 
international trade (2. corresponding to B. and C.), the third claims Afri-
can colonies for Germany (3. corresponding to B.), the fourth demands 
the restoration of independence for Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro (4. 
corresponding to A.). This was followed by a demand for a referendum in 
Alsace-Lorraine and Poland over the question of which state they belong 
to (5.), a demand to abolish all national and religious persecution and to 
institute international control over the issue (6.), and a demand for gen-
eral disarmament and the establishment of a higher international court of 
arbitration (7. corresponding to E. and F.).
The ways in which Grundbesitzer’s text differs from the principles of 
the Neutral Peace Conference can be seen in the tendency towards favor-
ing “repressed nations” (particularly the inhabitants of the “former Swed-
ish Baltic Sea provinces”) and disfavoring Russia. In Otto Järte’s copy of 
the text, there are some telling marginal notes, probably originating from 
Kesküla’s hand. For example, next to condition 1., there is a note “Zu 90% 
gegen Russland gerichtet“ (“By 90% directed against Russia”) and next to 
condition 6., again, “Gegen Russland gerichtet!” (“Directed against Rus-
sia!”). This certainly seems like a fair judgment. Similarly, the demand 
for referendums in 5. (instead of the restoration and return of territories 
demanded in the Neutral Conference’s appeal) can be seen as a strategic 
change intended to eliminate the possibility that the pre-war situation 
might be reinstated during peace talks, or Estonian territories given to 
Germany. This is a pattern in full harmony with Kesküla’s characteristic 
anti-Russian and anti-Baltic German convictions.
It would be interesting to know how much Ploompuu knew about the 
Neutral Peace Conference; whether addressing it had been one of the aims 
of his stay in Stockholm from the outset, and what exactly Kesküla’s role 
was in “facilitating” the meeting and Ploompuu’s presentation. However, 
for the lack of better knowledge, it seems most likely it was Kesküla him-
self who was the source of detailed knowledge about the aims of the peace 
conference displayed in the text. It is also probable that he was the main 
author, perhaps of the speech, but certainly of the memorandum. Further-
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of Ploompuu’s presentation, which makes it even more likely that the text 
in its present form is the work of Kesküla, composed some weeks after 
Ploompuu had left Sweden. But even if it was in fact written earlier, it seems 
rather unlikely that Ploompuu, not knowing much Swedish or German, 
could have been so well informed without Kesküla’s help. This conclusion 
can probably be extended to other Grundbesitzer texts, which seem to be 
even more clear-cut cases.
Of couse, from the perspective of Kesküla’s own habits of thought, an 
argument based on the right of national self-determination is rather sur-
prising. Olavi Arens, in his judgment of Kesküla’s aims, has emphasized the 
exact opposite: his preference for the principles of Realpolitik and a disre-
gard for the idea of national self-determination.54 But Kesküla was nothing 
if not a political opportunist. As Ploompuu’s stay in Stockholm provided 
him with a convenient pretext of expressing out-of-character thoughts, it 
is easy to see why he would do it. And finally, there is nothing in Grund-
besitzer’s text that would exclude the possibility of the Estonian national 
self-determination resulting in a union with Sweden – which was, in any 
case, Kesküla’s true goal.
The appeal to Swedish patriots
Whereas some background information has been preserved about the Neu-
tral Peace Conference text, there is little direct extra-textual evidence of 
who might have been the target audience of the second of Grundbesitzer’s 
texts. A clue, however, is provided by the fact that together with others, 
this text is preserved among the papers of leading Swedish activists, Otto 
Järte and Adrian Molin.
The fortunes of Swedish activists seemed to fluctuate with German vic-
tories and defeats. A high point of their propaganda for Sweden becoming 
a German ally and reestablishing itself as a regional great power, was the 
publication of the book “Sveriges utrikespolitik i världskrigets belysning” 
(“Sweden’s Foreign Policy in the Light of the World War”) in the summer 
of 1915, when Germany was scoring major victories on the Eastern Front. 
At that time, the activist cause had important sympathizers among Swed-
ish high society (including the queen of Sweden), and their propaganda 
for “bold involvement on the side of Germany” (modig uppslutning vid 
Tysklands sida)55 was a current, if not dominant factor in Swedish public 
54   Arens, Aleksander Kesküla, 30.
55   Järte et al., Sveriges utrikespolitik i världskrigets belysning, Förord.154 Ajalooline Ajakiri, 2012,  1/2 (139/140)
opinion. This period of success lasted until May 1916, when the failure of 
Gustaf Steffen’s interpellation in the Åland question dealt the movement 
a hard blow and partially changed its character.56
In March and April of 1916, however, hopes were still running high. 
Therefore, the claim of Olavi Arens that Kesküla’s contemporary idea of 
Sweden participating in the war against Russia was “wholly unrealistic”57 
must be taken with some caution. The evidence also contradicts Aleksander 
Loit’s assumption that there was no cooperation between Kesküla and the 
Swedish activists.58 At least according to Gummerus, Kesküla had close 
ties to the activist circles.59 Adrian Molin indeed mentions acquaintance 
with Kesküla in his unpublished memoirs.60 It also seems that Kesküla had 
some kind of contact with Järte.61
All in all, there is nothing particularly surprising about the writings of 
“Grundbesitzer aus Estland” ending up among Molin’s and Järte’s papers. 
Already on the basis of this circumstantial evidence, it seems very likely 
that it was, in fact, the Swedish activists who were the target audience of 
Grundbesitzer’s second memorandum.
The contents of the text are summarized as follows:
Already from the outset of the war, the people in the former Swedish 
Baltic Sea provinces have been awaiting Sweden’s entry into the war with 
the aim of protecting its interests and hindering Russia’s advance to the 
Atlantic ocean. More than ever, they have started taking seriously old tales 
about the victorious return of the Swedish army (such as the story about 
a stick of wood that Charles XII stuck into Estonian soil with the words 
“Once it will grow into a tree, the Swedish army shall return to Livonia” 
and which did, indeed, grow into a large tree by the road between Viljandi 
and Tartu). Such tales had been born out of the folk masses’ yearning for 
the good old times.
Immediately after Swedish rule had remarkably eased the situation of 
the peasants, they were forced again into hard slavery during Russian rule. 
But the memory of the “good Swedish times” remained in the soul of the 
56   Kihlberg, Aktivismens huvudorgan Svensk Lösen, 13.
57   Arens, Aleksander Kesküla, 31.
58   Loit, Baltisaksa rüütelkondade seisukohad ja tegevus Eesti iseseisvumisel 1918–1920, 64.
59   Gummerus, Jägare och aktivister, 192.
60   KB, Adrian Molins Efterlämnade Papper, L0046:16A Aktivismens historia 1914–1917, 
50.
61   Among Kesküla’s papers in the archive of Auswärtiges Amt, there is an empty envelope 
dated 28 July 1916 bearing Otto Järte’s address written in Kesküla’s hand together with 
the note “Einschreiben!” (“To be registered!”): Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amtes, 
Secret 11, Varia III, 1, l. 248785; see also EAA, f. 5377, n. 1, s. 74, l. 12.155 Mart Kuldkepp: Activist regionalism in the Baltic Sea area in 1916
people and is strong even today, as people know that it was in the Swedish 
times that the foundations for the development of Estonian culture were 
laid, whereas the Russian administration did nothing but try to hinder 
and persecute Estonian education, literature, and art in any way possible.
The news of Russian war losses are not received with displeasure by 
Estonians, but neither is the advancing German army regarded as a libera-
tor. Rather, it is seen as an even more grave danger, since it is known how 
Germans have treated nations subjected to them in Lotring, Schleswig, and 
Posen. The Baltic German nobility has also given much ground for hostile 
attitudes towards Germans. It was, after all, they who let the former Swed-
ish Baltic Sea provinces be moved under Russian rule, receiving extensive 
feudal privileges in return. The majority of Estonians are therefore afraid 
that with German rule, these privileges would be affirmed once more.
Until now, Estonians had been hoping that as German troops arrive, 
Sweden would also enter the war in order to secure its future, and would, 
in the case of German victory, become a just and neutral ruler over these 
territories. But now people have begun to understand that Sweden has 
no certain wish to participate in the war, meaning that one hated foreign 
rule might have to be traded for another. This is why Estonians turn to 
Sweden in their conviction that Sweden would not remain indifferent to 
the fate of the people, whose culture it itself once established, and hoping 
that Swedish patriots would use their personal influence and connections 
to protect Estonians. In particular, they should inform the German Gen-
eral Staff about the situation, so that all misunderstandings with Germans 
could be avoided.
In case Sweden does not want to give up its neutrality before the end of 
the war, it should at least ask for compensation at the peace talks from the 
Entente for having remained neutral. In order to stop the Russian advance 
towards the Atlantic ocean, Sweden should demand that full autonomy 
be guaranteed to all the small nations living across the coast of Sweden. 
In the case of German victory as well, it would be natural if the Swedish 
government did everything possible during the peace talks so that Estoni-
ans would be conferred as large a degree of self-determination as possible. 
Finally, it would be in Sweden’s own interests, if a buffer zone of strong 
peoples with their unique culture and a form of self-government would 
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“Grundbesitzer aus Estland” and Swedish activism
The hypothesis that the second of Grundbesitzer’s texts was targeted at 
Swedish activists can be checked by comparing its ideas to those expressed 
in the book Sveriges utrikespolitik i världskrigets belysning (commonly 
known as the “war book” or the “activist book”). In the Grundbesitzer text, 
the main motifs are the need to weaken Russia, the traditionally positive 
Estonian attitude towards Sweden (and the corresponding call for a Swed-
ish noblesse oblige), and a distrust of Germany. It can be said that at least 
concerning the first two themes, Grundbesitzer’s common ground with 
Swedish activism is remarkable indeed.
In the preface of the war book, written by Rudolf Kjellén, two geopo-
litical motivations are ascribed to Russia: an attraction towards Constan-
tinople and a desire to break out onto the world seas.62 In the war, where 
Russia and Britain have become united in common hate against Germany, 
Sweden, as it is caught between the great powers, has to do something 
in order to protect its national interests. Swedish interests, however, are 
primarily connected to the Baltic Sea, for “the natural face of Sweden is 
turned towards the East” and the main geographical fact that determines 
the political status of Sweden in the world is therefore its relation to Rus-
sia. But as Russia is naturally inclined to move towards the Atlantic, and 
Sweden is a hindrance on its way, two political correlations can be derived 
from this fact: when Sweden is strong, it has to expand towards the east, 
and conversely, when Sweden is weak, it is endangered from the east.63
Twice in its history – in the early Middle Ages and in the seventeenth 
century – Sweden had been a great power. Now, time had come again for 
Sweden to regain its position in the Baltic Sea area, to avoid falling prey 
to the fate of Galicia or Finland. Furthermore, Sweden shares a common 
destiny (pressure from the east) and a common interest (the freedom of 
the Baltic Sea) with Germany. Therefore, there exists a natural basis for a 
Swedish-German alliance, further supported by shared memories of the 
battles of Gustav Adolf.64 The grave Russian danger to the Swedish future 
can be avoided only in one way: through a “bold involvement on the side of 
Germany”65, which would enable Sweden to fulfill its “historical mission” 
62   Järte, et al., Sveriges utrikespolitik i världskrigets belysning, 3.
63   Ibid., 6–7.
64   Ibid., 12–14.
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as a champion of Germanic culture and a bulwark against the barbarity 
threatening from the east.66
In a similar fashion, Grundbesitzer’s text presents the entry of Swe-
den into the war, in order to “protect its interests” and hinder the Rus-
sian scramble for the Atlantic, as a geopolitical necessity long counted 
on by the people of the “former Swedish Baltic Sea provinces”. Likewise, 
the text puts a strong emphasis on the importance of the memory of the 
seventeenth century. A major difference, as might be expected, lies in the 
attitude towards Germany. Although Sweden is regarded, as by activists, 
as a probable ally of Germany, the author of the Grundbesitzer’s text does 
not mean that their aims would be wholly compatible. Rather, Sweden is 
supposed to exert a controlling influence over Germans, remembering the 
historical treacherousness of the Baltic German nobility. But even if Swe-
den would decline to enter the war, the author regards it to be morally, 
geopolitically, and mnemopolitically obliged to act benevolently towards 
Estonians, at the very least guaranteeing their post-war autonomy. This 
aspect in particular makes this memorandum rather close in intention to 
the Neutral Peace Conference text.
The most remarkable rhetorical commonality between the texts, besides 
how Russian geopolitical interests are being depicted, is the emphasis on 
common historical memories and cultural roots from which the historical 
mission of Sweden is derived. In a Beilage added to one of the copies of the 
text, “Der Uebersetzer” writes that the “naive helplessness” of the text at 
hand reflects the historical plight of the “forgotten Transbaltic irredenta” 
of Sweden. At the same time, it is supposedly indicative of a wider political 
suffering of Northern Europe, the leading state of which does not seem to 
know or want to know anything about its historical mission – “the political 
consolidation of the Northern European economical and cultural region”.
Adrian Molin clearly means something similar when he writes that 
Sweden has to accept its “naturally leading position in Norden” and as a 
leader of Northern Germanic peoples unify both Finland and other Scan-
dinavian countries in the struggle against the lower races.67 No neutrality 
policy can free Sweden from fulfilling this mission, as it arises from Swe-
den’s own location and history.68 Sweden’s main concern should be with 
Finland. “Finns are our own, Swedish people,” writes Molin, founded on 
Swedish order, laws and religion. It is in Finland, where 400,000 people of 
66   Kihlberg, Aktivismens huvudorgan Svensk Lösen, 15.
67   Järte, et al., Sveriges utrikespolitik i världskrigets belysning, 22–23.
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Swedish origin are still living, that “Sweden has its own irredenta.”69 There-
fore, Sweden is obliged to guarantee that Finland would not be russified, 
but would form a bulwark between Sweden and Russia.70 Something very 
similar is being demanded in the Grundbesitzer’s text in connection with 
the territory of Estonians, also depicted as having a strong historical con-
nection to Sweden and a possible buffer zone between Sweden and Russia.
Achieving some sort of an Estonian-Swedish union was perhaps Keskü-
la’s main aim during the war. A statement to that effect is found already in 
his earliest letter to Germans from September 1914.71 The idiosyncratic for-
mulation “former Swedish Baltic Sea provinces” also has its origins there.72 
The most thorough treatment of “the centuries-old historical mission of 
the Northern European civilization” to consolidate itself for the sake of 
common defense and cultural development, is found in the memorandum 
that Kesküla presented in Lausanne later in 1916.73 The fact that he had been 
skillful in making use of the motif of the “good old Swedish times” in his 
relationship with the Swedish activists was already noted by Gummerus.74
In conclusion, Grundbesitzer’s appeal to the Swedish patriots, if not 
written with the activist war book literally open next to the typewriter, at 
least seems to have been consciously modeled on activist rhetoric, depart-
ing from it only by a certain wariness of Germany. In addition to that, there 
are clear parallels in form and content to Kesküla’s other similar writings.
The proposal of a political program in case of a German invasion
The third of Grundbesitzer’s writings, “The proposal of a political program 
in the case of the invasion of the German army into the land of Estonians”,75 
is similar to Ploompuu’s 1915 memorandum to the Swedish General Staff, 
insofar as it also contains a proposal for a post-invasion manifesto. Unlike 
the earlier text, this one is not addressed to the Swedes but the Germans, 
69   Järte, et al., Sveriges utrikespolitik i världskrigets belysning, 18.
70   Ibid., 20.
71   Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amtes, Wk, 11c, secr. Bd. 1, l. 113. See also Jaanson, 
Eestlane Aleksander Kesküla ja Berliin: avang, 14, Zetterberg, Die Liga der Fremdvölker 
Russlands 1916–1918, 54.
72   “[D]ie früheren schwedischen Ostseeprovinzen: Ehstland, Livland & Ingermanland 
(offiz. Gouvernement St. Petersburg)”, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amtes, Wk, 
11c, secr. Bd. 1, l. 113.
73   [Kesküla], La Question Esthonienne et la Question Septentrionale, 20.
74   Gummerus, Jägare och aktivister, 192.
75   KB, Otto Järtes Efterlämnade Papper, L78:5 Entwurf eines politischen Programmes 
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and it remains unclear whether it was to some extent modeled on the ear-
lier memorandum.
In summary, the contents of the text are as follows:
The reason why victorious German armies are not greeted as libera-
tors by the oppressed nationalities of Russia, as the whole of Europe once 
exaltedly welcomed the troops of Napoleon, is that a banner of liberty was 
put out for the whole world to see at the beginning of the Napoleonic wars. 
The German victory, on the contrary, is understood as something bene-
fiting only Germany and nobody else. For that reason, the nations on the 
periphery of Russia, although terribly oppressed by the central adminis-
tration, cannot regard Germans as liberators, for it is known how roughly 
Germany had treated other subjugated peoples: Danes and Poles.
Estonians cannot understand why Germans, who otherwise have put 
everything in service of the war effort, would not attempt to provide the 
Russian national minorities with a greater degree of freedom and better 
chances of development, thereby winning their sympathy.
In order to avoid the waste of resources and expressions of hostility, 
the German troops, once they have invaded the Estonian territory, have to 
make public a manifesto in the local language and signed by the highest 
state instance. In the manifesto, it should be guaranteed that the German 
population would have no special privileges in comparison with the Esto-
nians, that the German language would enjoy no special rights, that all tax-
payers would be given a chance to take part in the self-government of the 
land, and that Estonians would be given full autonomy inside the borders 
of the former Swedish Baltic Sea provinces of Estland, Livland, and Ingria. 
Self-government would be based on a general right to vote and have the 
same rights that the Finnish Diet had in the constitutional period. Should 
the Estonian and Finnish peoples want to attach themselves to Sweden 
by majority vote, Germany would not be allowed to hinder it in any way.
As soon as these promises were made public, all reasonable people would 
use all their personal influence to avoid any kind of expressions of hostility. 
In that way, order would be ensured in the country and the army would not 
have to needlessly waste its resources. Furthermore, there would certainly 
be numerous people even wanting to help the German army.
The oppressed nations of Russia and German war aims
To untangle the context of the third of Grundbesitzer’s texts, it is useful 
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found in Otto Järte’s archive. The section concerning Napoleon is accom-
panied by the note “cf. the following Reichstag speech”. At the end of the 
text, there is a second note: “Sent to the German government before Beth-
mann Hollweg’s Reichstag speech on the ‘liberator mission’ of Germany”. 
The Reichstag speech referred to can only be chancellor Bethmann Holl-
weg’s famous speech from 6 April 1916.76 Replying to the criticism of British 
prime minister Asquith,77 Bethmann Hollweg included for the first time 
liberation and protection of the small European nations among German 
war aims. As argued by Fritz Fischer: by making Germany the protector of 
“the long-suffering Flemish people” and thus of the nationalities principle 
itself, Bethmann Hollweg turned a whole new page in the Belgian question.78
But German ambitions were not to be limited to Belgium. Bethmann 
Hollweg also assured his listeners that Germany would never concede to 
the peoples “between the Baltic Sea and the Volynian Marshes”, liberated 
by Germany and her allies, being re-unified to reactionary Russia, “whether 
they be Poles, Lithuanians, Balts or Latvians”.79 It seems as if the author of 
the marginal notes in the text (probably Kesküla himself) wanted to under-
line the prophetic nature of the mysterious Grundbesitzer, having rightly 
guessed – or even influenced – the direction that the German nationali-
ties policy would be shortly taking.
There is, however, another possibility: namely that the author of the 
third Grundbesitzer text was aware of the German interest in the oppressed 
nationalities of Russia before it became publicly known thanks to Beth-
mann Hollweg’s speech. This interest was obviously not idealistic, as the 
chancellor made it seem, but intended to weaken Russia by taking advan-
tage of the national tensions inside it. By supporting separatist movements, 
Germany also hoped to win the trust of anti-Russian circles in Great Brit-
ain and the United States.80
At the time of Ploompuu’s stay in Stockholm, on 10 March 1916, the 
German ambassador in Bern, Gisbert von Romberg, was visited by Lithu-
anian exile politician Juozas Gabrys. In 1912, Gabrys had been one of the 
76  Bethmann Hollwegs Kriegsreden, ed. by Friedrich Thimme (Stuttgart und Berlin: 
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1919), 90–102.
77   Asquith had demanded the full restoration of Polish independence, security guarantees 
to France, protection of the rights of the small European nations and the destruction of 
Prussian militarism: Fritz Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht: die Kriegszielpolitik des 
kaiserlichen Deutschlands 1914/18, 3. ed. (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1964), 297.
78   Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht, 297.
79   Thimme, Bethmann Hollwegs Kriegsreden, 97.
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founders of Union des Nationalités, an organization representing the inter-
ests of otherwise unrepresented nations. This time, he proposed something 
along the same lines: a pro-German League of the Small Nations of Russia.81 
On exactly the same day as Gabrys visited Romberg, a comparable meet-
ing took place in Berlin, organized by the Baltic German, Friedrich von 
der Ropp. His prospective nationalities organization was to be called Los 
von Russland and had as its aim the dissolution of Russia along national 
borders.82 Auswärtiges Amt brought Gabrys and Ropp together, resulting 
in the German-financed organization Die Liga der Fremdvölker Russlands 
being formally established on 25 April 1916.83
Kesküla had in fact predated Gabrys and Ropp by more than a year, 
presenting a similar plan to Romberg already in February 1915.84 Once the 
Liga was established, Kesküla decided against joining due to its pro-Baltic 
German character,85 but nevertheless participated as an independent del-
egate in the III Conference of the Union des Nationalités in Lausanne,86 
dominated by the Liga.87
In any case, it seems clear that for such a statement as in the third 
Grundbesitzer text to be made – superficially critical of Germany as it 
seems to be – the timing was precisely right in March 1916. Whether it 
could have played some role in the final formation of the new German lib-
erator-mission, thus lending some credibility to Kesküla’s marginal notes, 
is more doubtful. But in any case it seems that Kesküla himself, privy to 
inside information about the German nationalities policy, must have con-
sciously modeled his text with that goal in mind.
The aspect in which the memorandum differs from Bethmann Holl-
weg’s speech is its anti-Baltic German agenda, characteristic of Kesküla. 
As a way of guaranteeing Estonian support for Germany, equal treatment 
of all local nationalities is demanded, while also leaving open the possi-
bility of a union with Sweden. Thus, even if accepting the possibility of 
German invasion – about which he had posed a question to Auswärtiges 
81   Zetterberg, Die Liga der Fremdvölker Russlands 1916–1918, 67–68; Jaanson, Eestlane 
Aleksander Kesküla ja rahvuste uniooni III konverents Lausanne’is 1916. aastal, 1833.
82   Jaanson, Eestlane Aleksander Kesküla ja rahvuste uniooni III konverents Lausanne’is 
1916. aastal, 1838.
83   Ibid., 1846.
84   Ibid., 1834.
85   Ibid., 1849.
86   Zetterberg, Die Liga der Fremdvölker Russlands 1916–1918, 116–117.
87   Jaanson, Eestlane Aleksander Kesküla ja rahvuste uniooni III konverents Lausanne’is 
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Amt already in September 191488 – Kesküla could use the guise of Grund-
besitzer to attempt to influence its exact course in a favorable direction.
Conclusions
It seems very likely that Aleksander Kesküla’s role in producing the Grund-
besitzer texts was rather that of the author, not merely of the translator 
and commentator. As Kesküla himself wrote to Steinwachs already before 
meeting Ploompuu, the arrival of the latter was a good chance of underpin-
ning his own propaganda – a chance he apparently attempted to exploit to 
the fullest. His main aims of weakening Russia, bringing Estonia closer to 
benevolent Sweden, and averting the danger of Baltic German dominance 
are all being furthered in the writings signed “Grundbesitzer aus Estland.” 
By using this mystification loosely based on Ploompuu, instead of signing 
with his own name Kesküla could target American pacifists, Swedish activ-
ists, and the German government with similar ease, unburdened by the 
baggage of his reputation. The Grundbesitzer texts are skillfully adapted to 
make use of tendencies in each of its target groups, including the increas-
ing attention paid to the idea of the self-determination of nationalities, the 
Swedish great power dreams, and the German self-interested support for 
the national minorities of Russia. By writing in the name of an envoy sup-
posedly representing a patriotic organization in Estonia (and the Estonian 
middle classes) and visiting Sweden on his own initiative, Kesküla could 
show that attitudes similar to his own had broad support among Estonians.
Of course, the real validity of this theory is hard to judge, but in any 
case it seems justified to regard “Grundbesitzer aus Estland” more as Kes-
küla’s pseudonym, rather than Ploompuu’s.
It is a similarly difficult to judge whether Jakob Ploompuu was simply a 
small cog in Kesküla’s propaganda machine, or whether the Grundbesitzer 
texts also somehow reflect his own initiative – or that of the mysterious 
patriotic circles in Estonia he claimed to represent. But already a superfi-
cial analysis of the texts nevertheless seems to reveal them to be written 
by a skillful and informed politician, knowing much about the current 
political issues in Sweden, Germany, and the world at large. It therefore 
seems rather unlikely that Ploompuu’s role could have been very major – 
especially since his previous attempt from 1915 seems rather amateurish 
in comparison, if Kesküla’s account of it is to be believed.
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At the same time, the episode with “Grundbesitzer aus Estland” nev-
ertheless shows that “Estonian activism” as a phenomenon was not nec-
essarily confined to the person of Aleksander Kesküla, but – as Kesküla 
himself was pleased to admit – industrious private politicians could be 
found in Estonia itself attempting to take advantage of the ongoing war in 
order to draw Swedish attention to the Estonian question, however naively 
they went about it.89 In a way, the fact that there was an Estonian variant 
of activism itself confirms the idea of the historical unity of the Baltic Sea 
region, so close to Kesküla’s heart.
From Estonian historiography concerned with these pivotal years, the 
lone wolves of Kesküla’s and Ploompuu’s kind are usually either absent or 
belittled as adventurers and fortune-seekers.90 But still, to consider their 
activities illegitimate, utopian, and isolated might be somewhat anach-
ronistic. In a situation where free and democratic elections could not be 
organized, nobody had more right than others to speak in the name of the 
whole people of Estonia. The practicality of their plans can only be judged 
in hindsight, and there could have hardly been anyone in 1916 who would 
have thought the likely outcome of the war to be the defeat of both Russia 
and Germany, as it actually happened. Even the impression of their isola-
tion is premature. Probably no Estonian at the time was internationally as 
well-connected as Kesküla, and even Ploompuu had functional contacts 
with Finnish activists (and probably other Estonians as well), both being 
part of an extensive transnational movement, long-forgotten nowadays as 
it may be. Even though the efforts of activists ultimately led to a dead end, 
they nevertheless were a sign of the bold dreams and ambitions that could 
raise their head in times of confusion, only to subdue once the situation 
had been stabilized.
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89  About Ploompuu’s speech, Kaido Jaanson remarks that it is “a case of raising 
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Kokkuvõte: „Grundbesitzer aus Estland“: aktivistlik regionalism 
Läänemereruumis 1916. aastal
Artikkel vaatleb ühte seni väheuuritud Esimese maailmasõja aegset katset 
Eesti küsimust rahvusvahelisel tasandil tõstatada, asetades selle nn akti-
vistliku regionalismi kui rahvusvahelise nähtuse konteksti. Aktivistliku 
regionalismi all pean silmas peamiselt Rootsi ja Soome patriootide tegevust 
hõlmanud liikumist Esimese maailmasõja ajal, mille sihiks oli tõmmata 
Rootsi sõtta Saksamaa poolel, et nõrgestada Venemaad, tagasi vallutada 
Soome ning anda Rootsile tagasi regionaalse suurvõimu staatus. Soome ja 
Rootsi aktivistid, kelle eesmärgid põhiosas ühtisid, tegid omavahel tihedat 
koostööd. Ka vähemalt ühte eestlast, eradiplomaat Aleksander Kesküla, 
võib pidada aktivistiks, kuna temagi poliitilised eesmärgid olid samalaad-
sed – vaid selle erinevusega, et lisaks Soomele eeldas ta ka endiste Rootsi 
Läänemereprovintside tagasivallutamist Rootsi poolt. Lisaks oli ta isiklike 
sidemete kaudu lähedalt seotud Rootsi ja Soome aktivistidega.
Episood, millele artikkel keskendub, on seotud Jakob Ploompuu sala-
jase saabumisega Stockholmi 1916. aastal märtsis ning koostööga tema ja 
samuti Stockholmis viibinud Aleksander Kesküla vahel. Soome aktivisti-
dega kontakte omanud Ploompuu eesmärk oli uurida Rootsi sõtta astumise 
võimalust ja selle võimalikku mõju eestlastele. Tema reisi kõrgpunktiks 
kujunes esinemine nn Neutraalsel Rahukonverentsil.
Peatselt pärast Ploompuu lahkumist loodi mõned memorandumilaad-
sed, väidetavalt eesti keelest saksa keelde tõlgitud tekstid allkirjaga „Grund-
besitzer aus Estland“, mille autorlus on omistatud anonüümsele, hiljuti 
Stockholmis Eesti patriootlikke ringkondi esindamas käinud eestlasele (st 
Ploompuule). Nimetatud tekstideks on esiteks Neutraalsele Rahukonve-
rentsile mõeldud pöördumine, teiseks nn. apell Rootsi patriootidele, kol-
mandaks tekst pealkirjaga „Ettepanek poliitiliseks programmiks Saksamaa 
sissemarsi puhuks Eestisse“ ja neljandaks tõlge Tallinna Teatajas ilmunud 
artiklist eestlaste vastu tõstatatud süüdistustest ülemäärases rahvustundes.
Artiklis on nn Grundbesitzeri tekste analüüsitud eesmärgiga selgi-
tada välja nende tõenäoline autor ja sihtgrupid. Nii tekstide sisu kui teisi 
kaudseid tõendeid arvesse võttes näib, et autoriks oli ilmselt Aleksander 
Kesküla ja mingigi tõendatav seos Ploompuu endaga tundub eksisteerivat 
vaid nn Rahukonverentsi-teksti puhul. Selle teooria kasuks räägib nii see, 
et tekstid annavad tunnistust väga heast poliitilisest informeeritusest, kui 
ka see, et neis leidub paralleele Kesküla teiste kaasaegsete kirjutistega. Ka 
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Poliitiline informeeritus väljendub selles, et tekstide autor on olnud hästi 
kursis oma sihtgruppide – Neutraalse Rahukonverentsi, Rootsi aktivistide 
ja Saksa välisministeeriumi – aktuaalsete taotlustega 1916. aasta kevadel. 
Viimaste seas oli rahutingimusi sisaldava rahvusvahelisele üldusele mõel-
dud apelli koostamine, milles oli pööratud suurt tähelepanu rahvuste ene-
semääramise printsiibile; Rootsi taaskehtestamine Läänemereregiooni 
suurvõimuna ning Venemaa võõrrahvuste separatistlike meeleolude ära 
kasutamine, et Venemaad sisemiselt nõrgestada.
Nagu nähtub ühest kaasaegsest Kesküla kirjast, oli Ploompuu saabu-
mine tema jaoks õnnelik juhus, mis andis talle võimaluse tõendamaks, et 
tema Skandinaavia-suunalistel püüdlustel on Eestis ka laiemat kõlapinda. 
Ilmselt seetõttu kirjutas Kesküla nimetatud memorandumid just sel viisil, 
omistades neis (küll nimesid mitte nimetades) Ploompuule autori, endale 
aga tõlkija rolli. Lisaks võimaldas varjunimi tal väljendada mõtteid, mis 
erinesid tema harjumuspärastest (nt asetada rõhku rahvuste enesemäära-
mise õiguse ideele).
Samal ajal näitab Grundbesitzeri-juhtum siiski, et „Eesti aktivism“ ei 
piirdunud vaid Kesküla isikuga, vaid ka Eestis leidus erapoliitikuid, kes 
püüdsid Esimest maailmasõda ära kasutada juhtimaks Eesti küsimusele 
Rootsi ja rahvusvahelist tähelepanu. Vähemalt selles mõttes vastab Kes-
külale nii südamelähedane mõte Läänemereregiooni ajaloolisest ühtsu-
sest tõele.